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Is "Narrative" Really a Panacea? 
The Use of "Narrative" in the Work 
of Metz and Hauerwas* 
Paul Lauritzen / John Carroll University 
The category of narrative or story has received much attention in 
recent discussions of Christian theology and ethics. Indeed, the theme 
of narrative is so popular today that a virtual cottage industry of aca- 
demic scholarship has grown up around the discussion of this theme.' 
This essay adds to the growing literature on the topic of narrative, but 
my intention is not to contribute to the substantive debate on this topic. 
Rather, this paper raises a more preliminary question: why has the 
notion of narrative suddenly become so much discussed as a category of 
theological and ethical reflection? The answer, I suggest, is that the 
category of narrative appears to be almost a panacea for the ills 
afflicting contemporary theology and ethics. In particular, the category 
of narrative appears to address problems arising from the tenuous cog- 
nitive status of Christianity in the modern world. One of the major 
objectives of this paper, then, will be to see how, and to what specific 
ills, narrative is a putative remedy. 
To accomplish this objective, I will rehearse one account of the prob- 
lems besetting contemporary Christian thought, that set out by Jeffrey 
Stout in his book, Flightfrom Authority.2 Stout's presentation of the con- 
temporary problematic is very helpful in explaining the predilection for 
narrative in current discussions. Briefly summarized, what Stout 
argues is that, as a result of the breakdown of the traditional category of 
* I would like to thank John P. Reeder, Jr., and the two anonymous readers for TheJournal of 
Religion whose suggestions were both extremely helpful and much appreciated. 
1 For a review of some of the growing literature on the topic of narrative, see George Stroup, 
"A Bibliographical Critique," Theology Today 32, no. 2 (July 1975): 133-43, as well as Stroup's 
The Promise of Narrative Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981). See also the October 1983 
thematic issue of Interpretation, vol. 37, no. 4. 
2 Jeffrey Stout, Flight from Authority (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981). 
o 1987 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/87/6703-0004$01.00 
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authority, and with the introduction of the modern conception of 
probability, Christian believers were, and are, faced with the following 
dilemma: either they reformulate their beliefs in a way that is compat- 
ible with modernity - in which case the beliefs inevitably lose their dis- 
tinctiveness -or they positively celebrate the paradoxical nature of the 
beliefs-in which case the beliefs remain incomprehensible and hence 
socially irrelevant in the modern world. I suggest that the prevalence of 
the category of narrative, in recent Christian ethics in particular, may 
be accounted for by the fact that it seems to be almost perfectly suited 
to negotiate the dilemma set out by Stout. 
To lend force to this suggestion I will examine the place of narrative 
in the work of two contemporary Christian ethicists, Johannes Metz 
and Stanley Hauerwas. Although these writers represent different reli- 
gious traditions, both rely in significant ways on the category of narra- 
tive in their work. What I hope to show is that, in both cases, the 
appeal to narrative is intended to resolve the sorts of difficulties intro- 
duced by Stout: both Metz and Hauerwas are concerned to revitalize 
Christian faith, both want to make it once again socially relevant, and 
both are adamant that it retain its distinctiveness. That both should 
also place such a heavy emphasis on the concept of narrative I will 
argue is not coincidental. 
This paper, then, will examine the use of the category of narrative in 
the work of Metz and Hauerwas. The burden of the paper will be to 
show both that Metz and Hauerwas share a vision of narrative and of 
its place in addressing the problems raised by Stout and that Metz and 
Hauerwas decidedly do not share a vision of the specific normative 
implications of the Christian narrative(s). The agreement between 
Metz and Hauerwas highlights the attractiveness of the category of 
narrative in confronting long-standing problems in theology and 
ethics, while their disagreement underscores some of the new problems 
that the use of narrative raises for theology and ethics. 
The paper itself is divided into essentially four parts. The first part 
sets the stage for a discussion of the place of narrative in the work of 
Metz and Hauerwas by reviewing the account Stout gives of what he 
calls the "dialectical situation of contemporary theism." Metz and 
Hauerwas are then taken up in turn, and an attempt is made to show 
that, despite the differences in terminology and emphasis, both are 
wrestling with essentially the same problems and that both rely on nar- 
rative as a crucial problem-solving tool. The fourth section notes some 
of the direct correlations between the work of Metz and Hauerwas and 
in conclusion identifies some of the problems both must face if they are 
to make narrative a viable category of Christian ethics. 
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THE DIALECTICAL SITUATION OF CONTEMPORARY THEISM 
There are many different stories that could be told of the history of 
Christian thought in the modern world. One of the merits of that 
recounted by Jeffrey Stout in his book, Flight from Authority, is that it 
helps uncover the reasons for the current appeal of the concept of nar- 
rative. According to Stout, our current problems have their roots most 
deeply in the soil of seventeenth-century thought and, in particular, in 
the emergence of a decidedly modern conception of probability. The 
significance of this development is found in the departure it represents 
from the previous conception of probability. Prior to the introduction 
of statistical and evidential criteria for assessing a proposition's truth, 
probability essentially consisted of approval by authority, whether in 
the form of an appeal to the right persons or to the right books. And 
this meant that even the most paradoxical beliefs were considered 
highly probable so long as they had the right imprimatur. Thus, the 
introduction of the new probability changed the religious situation 
drastically. For with this introduction, the connection between proba- 
bility and authority was broken. And this in turn meant that the reli- 
gious believer was left with the unenviable task of attempting to supply 
new reasons for believing that the central claims of theism, claims that 
no longer seemed inherently probable, were indeed more probable 
than not. As the title of Stout's book intimates, it is this flight from 
authority and to the new probability that is both characteristic of 
modernity and determinative of the Church's precarious position in the 
modern world. 
With this flight from authority, Stout suggests, Christian believers 
are confronted with an uncomfortable choice: either they attempt to 
revise their beliefs in an effort to meet the new criteria of truthfulness, 
or they cling to traditional beliefs, however improbable these beliefs 
may appear. Unfortunately, says Stout, both options have deleterious 
consequences. To choose the first course, that of revision, requires 
abandoning or recasting any beliefs too paradoxical to be made prob- 
able. The problem with this response to modernity is that the more one 
abandons or recasts, the less like traditional theism the revised faith 
becomes. Alternatively, not to revise would appear to consign theism to 
the margins of public life, for an unreconstructed theism will appear 
too improbable to be taken seriously by modern culture. Hence, in the 
modern world, Christianity is faced with the problem of how to escape 
this dilemma: indistinctness or irrelevance. To attempt to revise the 
faith threatens to make it indistinctive; not to revise the faith threatens 
to make it irrelevant. 
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Now Stout is very good indeed at showing the way in which the 
movement of Christian thought from Deism to neoorthodoxy seems 
trapped in dialectical tension between these two poles. Although I 
cannot reproduce Stout's account in any detail, it is worth looking 
briefly at his depiction of several moments of this dialectic. The first 
centers around the figure of Kant. 
According to Stout, Kant's writings are impaled on one horn of the 
dilemma that menaces every modern attempt to defend Christian faith, 
that of irrelevance. Because Kant recognized the seriousness of Hume's 
challenge to the Deist attempt to make theism probable, Kant sought to 
avoid probabilistic arguments for theism. By doing so he avoided the 
danger to which Deism succumbed, namely, the other horn of the 
dilemma-lack of distinctiveness. Still, he could not make religious 
faith socially relevant. Kant could not maintain the relevance of Chris- 
tian faith, says Stout, because he pursued a strategy of separation: by 
declaring religion to be an improper matter for theoretical speculation, 
Kant created a formidable wall between Christian belief and the intel- 
lectual life of the culture. It was a wall, says Stout, that insured that 
religious life would be an essentially private rather than public affair. 
The second figure whose work illustrates the dangers facing any 
attempt to find a place for theism in the modern world is Hegel. Accord- 
ing to Stout, nothing better illustrates the dialectical situation of con- 
temporary theism than the situation of Hegel and his followers. In 
Stout's view, Hegel saw clearly the problems involved in the strategy of 
separation pursued by Kant (and Schleiermacher), and thus Hegel 
argued that "only by restoring to Christian theism its cognitive dimen- 
sion and by taking seriously precisely those paradoxical doctrines that 
make it seem distinctive to secular thought could it retain a role of any 
centrality in modern culture."3 Whereas the Deists had jettisoned the 
hard paradoxes of Christian faith as improbable, and while Kant had 
softened them with reductive interpretations, "Hegel was prepared to 
treat them as the essential truths of religious consciousness. Religious 
consciousness attempts to say in symbols and stories what ordinary 
consciousness cannot say in more direct fashion."4 Hegel's system, 
then, was an attempt to provide an interpretation of the hard paradoxes 
that made them both comprehensible and a matter of public faith. 
Thus, Hegel, perhaps better than anyone else, understood the 
dilemma confronting modern theism and he resolutely sought to 
address it. 
3 Ibid., p. 139. 
4 Ibid., p. 136. 
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But, says Stout, if we find in Hegel's work the clearest recognition of 
the difficulties facing theism in the modern world, we have in the fate of 
Hegelianism a dramatic illustration of the near impossibility of success- 
fully negotiating these difficulties, even when they are recognized. 
Indeed, Stout thinks that it is impossible. "Hegel, it would seem, had 
attempted the impossible. Neither philosophical thought nor practical 
activity could be both completely secular and completely religious. 
Religion could not be both distinguishable and thoroughly integrated."5 
Moreover, the work of Hegel's successors attests to this fact. For no 
one seemed capable of steering the middle course Hegel had sought. 
And, once off course, there were only two options: shipwreck on the 
rocks of irrelevance (e.g., Kierkegaard) or shipwreck on the rocks of 
indistinctiveness (e.g., Feurbach and Marx). This is why Stout 
endorses Karl L6with's claim that Marx and Kierkegaard "pose the 
'exclusive' choices of post-Hegelian Christianity."6 
This, then, is Stout's sketch of the dialectical situation of contempo- 
rary theism. What we must consider at this point is the possibility that 
the concept of narrative offers an alternative to these two bleak choices. 
For what I want to suggest in the next two sections of this paper is that 
it is precisely the apparent ability of the concept of narrative to resolve 
Stout's dilemma that makes it such an attractive category of contempo- 
rary Christian thought. In other words, an appeal to the category of 
narrative would seem to maintain both the distinctiveness and the rele- 
vance of Christian faith. 
NARRATIVE IN THE WORK OF JOHANNES METZ 
We can begin to track the connection between Stout's problematic and 
the use of the category of narrative in recent Christian thought by 
focusing on the work of Johannes Metz. In both Faith in History and 
Society7 and in an earlier work, A Theology of the World, 8 Metz appeals to 
narrative as one of the central categories of Christian thought. Thus, 
an examination of these two works is helpful for understanding the 
place of narrative in Metz's thought. As we will see, for Metz narrative 
serves to resolve problems very much like those raised by Stout. 
Now it may at first appear misguided, if not simply confused, to 
attempt to find a place for Metz in what is essentially an account of the 
history of Protestant thought in the modern world. Yet, if we turn to 
Metz's work, we find Metz himself describing the context of his thought 
5 Ibid., p. 140. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Johannes Metz, Faith in History and Society (New York: Seabury Press, 1980). 
8 Johannes Metz, A Theology of the World (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969). 
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in a way that echoes Stout's discussion. Consider, for example, the fol- 
lowing list of subheadings to a chapter designed to set the stage for his 
own constructive position: "The Crisis of Tradition," "The Crisis of 
Authority," "The Crisis of (Metaphysical) Reason," and, finally, 
"Religion in a State of Crisis." Moreover, when we turn to the sections 
themselves, we discover that there is more than surface resemblance 
here; the crises are genuinely similar. Metz argues, for example, that 
one of the results of the Enlightenment-from which all these crises 
spring-was the breakdown of the unity between religion and society, a 
breakdown that put Christian theologians in the novel position of hav- 
ing to make a case for the relevance of the Christian faith. In fact, says 
Metz, endorsing a view set out by Peter Berger, as the split between 
religion and society grew wider, the churches were faced with two 
options. 
As socially plausible structures of Christianity, the churches can either try to 
adapt themselves to the definitions of reality made by the surrounding world 
or strengthen their own positions as cognitive minorities with regard to the 
world around them. There are, however, considerable difficulties involved in 
both these alternatives for the inner structure of Christianity. The first alterna- 
tive threatens the spiritual content of Christianity .... The second alternative 
is in collision with the Christian churches' understanding of themselves that 
has existed since the time of Constantine as institutions that are involved in 
many different ways with society as a whole.9 
Now these two options are essentially those identified by Stout, and 
Metz seems to imply that the consequences of adopting either option 
are those highlighted by Stout as well: irrelevance or lack of distinctive- 
ness. Metz goes on to point out, for example, that the history of Cath- 
olic thought during this period is not without representatives of both of 
these strategies. On the one hand, says Metz, there is the response of 
neoscholasticism, which effectively created a "neoscholastic ghetto," in 
which the Church attempted to remain isolated from contemporary his- 
torical and philosophical concerns. The unfortunate consequence of 
this response to the challenge of the Enlightenment was social obscurity. 
On the other hand, when, in the form of the "new theology," the Church 
attempted to adopt itself to "the definitions of reality made by the sur- 
rounding world," the result was what Metz calls the privatization of 
theology. According to Metz, with the efforts of theologians such as 
Karl Rahner to accommodate "the autonomy of reason and the world," 
the practice of faith was reduced to a "timeless decision" of the 
autonomous individual. Unfortunately, says Metz, on this view, reli- 
gion ceases to be crucial in the social construction of the person and 
9 Metz, Faith in History and Society, p. 155. 
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comes, rather, to be understood as a boutonniere, so to speak, chosen 
by the autonomous and solitary individual who is already nearly fully 
dressed. 
Now if we step back from Metz's characterization of these two 
responses to the challenge posed by the Enlightenment, we can see that 
Metz has posed essentially the same dilemma as Stout: erosion of the 
content of faith (lack of distinctiveness) or social obscurity (irrele- 
vance). What is interesting here is that Metz clearly sees himself as try- 
ing to find a via media between these two unacceptable options. More- 
over, it is clear that Metz sees this middle way as paved by the concept 
of narrative. For Metz, appeal to the concept of narrative allows us to 
take seriously the cognitive challenge modernity poses to Christian 
faith without making Christianity either irrelevant or indistinctive. To 
see how narrative functions in this way we must turn to Metz's discus- 
sion of the concept of narrative. 
Unfortunately, Metz does not provide a systematic account of what 
he means by narrative, the narrative structure of theology, or a narrat- 
ing faith. Still, we can begin to see what Metz means by narrative by 
noting that on one level, when he talks about the need for a narrative 
form of theology, he means to do nothing more than to highlight the 
storytelling character of the Christian community. We must remem- 
ber, he writes, that Christianity "has, from the very beginning, not 
been primarily a community interpreting and arguing, but a commun- 
ity remembering and narrating with a practical intention."10 And it 
should be noted that both of these elements are central to his under- 
standing of narrative. Both the opposition of narrative to reasoning and 
argumentation and the connection between narrative and practical 
action are crucial.11 
Moreover, both of these points are connected to problems raised for 
the Church by the phenomenon of secularization. For example, Metz's 
preference for storytelling to argument seems to be born of the convic- 
tion that Christian faith can only be made intelligible to the modern 
world if it is presented in a nontheoretical way. This is why he says that 
we must learn to recognize the fact that stories of conversion, exodus, 
and the like are not simply "dramatic embellishments of a previously 
conceived 'pure' theology"l2 but rather form the "basic structure" of 
theology. Unfortunately, this is not something that liberal theologians 
have realized, and the result has been an attempt to adjust the theoret- 
10 Ibid., p. 212. 
11 "Opposition" is probably too strong here, for Metz does say that every story involves rea- 
soning and argument. The point, however, is that there is a very large difference in perspective 
between these two foci of theological thought. 
12 Metz, Faith in History and Society, p. 51. 
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ical content of faith in a way that makes it more acceptable to con- 
temporary believers. In fact, we have already seen one consequence of 
this failure to appreciate the unavoidably narrative structure of theol- 
ogy, namely, the new theology's emphasis on the moment of private 
decision. But, according to Metz, this sort of "existentialist theology" 
cannot but fail because "a purely argumentative theology which con- 
ceals its origins and does not make this present again and again in nar- 
rative memory inevitably leads... [to] the extinction of the identifiable 
content of Christian salvation."13 We need to break the "spell" of the 
idea of a total reconstruction of the faith based on abstract reason and 
to realize that christological knowledge "is not handed down primarily 
as a concept" but in the stories about Christ.14 Our consciousness, 
Metz argues, is inextricably "entwined" in stories, and thus our identity 
is always formed by "narrative identification." 
This is why the emphasis on narrative, for Metz, is so closely tied to 
the notion of practical action and why he argues that the picture of a 
solitary and autonomous individual assenting to the rationally recon- 
structed propositions of faith is so misleading. In both cases, the reason 
is that the stories that shape the individual must be thought of as defin- 
ing the very identity of the subject and cannot be conceived as a "super- 
structure" that gets added "onto an already formed identity of the sub- 
ject."15 Thus, ideally, the Christian story "enters deeply into the basis 
of existence" and hence leads directly to action. Further, since the 
stories themselves are essentially practical (i.e., stories about God 
acting for people), it is even possible to talk about the "primacy of 
praxis" in Christian theology. But the important point is this: only 
when we acknowledge that the structure of human consciousness is 
necessarily narrative will we recover the view that religion is the 
expression of a primary need. Only then will we abandon the notion 
that we must first argue and reason about religious concepts before ask- 
ing about religious practice. 
At this point we can perhaps best get clear about how, for Metz, nar- 
rative functions to resolve some of the difficulties facing contemporary 
Christian thought by stepping back and characterizing Metz's use of 
this category in terms of Stout's account. If we do this, I think it is pos- 
sible to argue that Metz's position is in some ways a variation of Kant's. 
Like Kant, Metz argues that the truthfulness of Christianity cannot be 
demonstrated in a purely speculative way. Like Kant, he believes that 
we must approach the faith through practical reason. Unlike Kant, 
13 Ibid., p. 213. 
14 Ibid., p. 52. 
15 Ibid., p. 62. 
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however, he does not believe that the stories of the Christian faith are 
merely moral allegories to be discarded with the arrival of a purely 
rational faith. Paradoxically, Kant had made Christianity irrelevant by 
substituting the question, What ought I to do? for the question, What 
can I know? Unfortunately, because for Kant the answer to the first 
question can be discovered without recourse to Christian faith, Chris- 
tianity became irrelevant. Metz, by contrast, does not substitute ques- 
tions of practical reason for questions of theoretical reason, but he does 
suggest that theoretical questions about what I can know are directly 
related to questions of practical reason. Moreover, according to Metz, 
the narrative structure of human consciousness and the narrative struc- 
ture of biblical faith insure that human praxis cannot be determined by 
Kant's purely rational faith. Human praxis is itself story bound. 
The category of narrative thus helps to overcome the difficulties in 
Kant's account because it allows Metz to talk about the connection 
between religion and practical reason without reducing the one to the 
other. On the contrary, if there is any reduction here, it is of practical 
reason to narrative. For, as Metz makes clear, it is the story that condi- 
tions moral action, not the need for practical action that conditions the 
story. Moreover, Metz's emphasis on narrative also allows him to 
second Hegel's endorsement of the necessarily communal nature of the 
Christian religion, without forcing him to support this commitment 
with an elaborate metaphysical schema in which the stories are shown 
to have a place. Taken simply as stories that still have life-transforming 
potential, the biblical narratives are intelligible, relevant, and distinc- 
tive. They are intelligible because they continue to have the power to 
shape and direct lives. They are relevant because such stories are inti- 
mately connected to practical social action, and they are distinctive 
because they are not just any old stories, but stories about the Chris- 
tian God that cannot be reduced to any universal human message with- 
out loss of content. 
NARRATIVE IN THE WORK OF STANLEY HAUERWAS 
If we turn now to the work of Stanley Hauerwas, we will see that the 
category of narrative functions for Hauerwas much as it does for Metz. 
That is, for Hauerwas, as for Metz, narrative is an attractive theolog- 
ical category, for it points to a way around the dilemma highlighted by 
Stout. 
The first thing that should be noted about Hauerwas's discussion of 
narrative is that, in contrast to Metz's treatment, it is systematically 
developed in response to what is identified as a mistaken (Enlighten- 
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ment) view of moral objectivity. Indeed, Hauerwas tells us that he 
focuses on the related categories of narrative and character as a way of 
developing an account of moral experience that does not suffer from the 
distorting effects of what he calls the "standard account" of moral 
rationality. Since narrative is to serve in this corrective role, we can 
begin by identifying the problematic features of this standard account. 
According to Hauerwas, there are at least three essential ways in which 
the standard account distorts the nature of our moral experience: it (1) 
places "unwarranted emphasis" on individual decisions in "quandary" 
situations, (2) fails to account for the importance of moral notions other 
than principles and rules, and (3) alienates the moral agent from his or 
her interests and passions. 
Now as anyone who is at all familiar with his work knows, Hauerwas 
lays the blame for these distortions largely on Kant and, in particular, 
on Kant's view of moral objectivity as involving a quest for univer- 
sality. As Hauerwas sees it, modern moral theory has been engaged in 
a futile attempt, initiated by Kant, "to secure for moral judgments an 
objectivity that would free such judgments from the subjective beliefs, 
wants and stories of the agent who makes them."16 Part of the explana- 
tion for this attempt, of course, is that moral philosophers have been 
gripped by a scientific ideal of objectivity and have thus sought to 
escape any suggestion of partiality. Unfortunately, says Hauerwas, 
this attempt to free reason from the concerns of particular individuals 
and communities has obscured the narrative character of our existence, 
including the moral aspects of our lives. Indeed, this preoccupation 
with the nonnarrative account of rationality has led directly to the 
problems listed above, for it has led moral philosophers to concentrate 
their attention on only one part of our lives-that concerned with 
moral decision making -as if this part were unconnected to the whole. 
This, in turn, has resulted in the illusion that our moral experience can 
be understood on the basis of rules and principles unconnected to our 
interests and life plans. Thus, Hauerwas argues that we must recover a 
narrative account of rationality if we are to overcome the problems 
besetting modern moral theory. 
The significance of all this for our purposes is that, according to 
Hauerwas, the problems facing modern moral theory are connected to 
problems confronting contemporary Christian ethics. To see the con- 
nection we need only attend to Hauerwas's account of the origin of 
Christian ethics as a self-conscious activity. In Hauerwas's view, this is 
16 Stanley Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1977), p. 16. 
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a rather recent development, dating roughly from the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Thus, he writes, 
The preoccupation with Christian ethics as a, if not the, central enterprise of 
Christian theology is primarily a legacy of Protestant liberalism. As the central 
Christian beliefs came under increasingly successful philosophical and histor- 
ical challenges, an emphasis on the moral significance of those beliefs seemed 
to offer a strategy to save their meaningfulness. Therefore, Christian ethics, as 
a self-conscious endeavor, represented a retrenchment to secure some mean- 
ing, if not truth, for religious belief. The moral implications of the doctrines of 
God, Jesus, and reconciliation appeared to be the nail on which the continued 
viability of Christianity could hang.17 
Once again we see highlighted a theme identified by Stout's prob- 
lematic. For what Hauerwas is suggesting is that one response to the 
challenge posed by the flight from authority was to substitute ethics for 
theology. This, as we have seen, was the response endorsed by Kant. 
But just as Metz rejects this Kantian move, so too does Hauerwas. The 
problem with this strategy is that, when combined with a nonnarrative 
view of moral rationality, it inevitably leads to a reductionistic account 
of religious belief. It does so because the whole point of the standard 
account is to arrive at rules and principles that are universally applic- 
able. Thus, any religious belief justified by appeal to the canons of this 
account will necessarily be stripped of its distinctiveness. "The 'moral' 
kernal," as Hauerwas puts it, will not "seem to require the 'religious' 
claims associated with it."18 
It will come as no surprise to learn that what Hauerwas suggests 
ought to be done here is to abandon the standard account of moral 
rationality and to reintroduce the category of narrative as central to 
Christian ethics. What may be surprising is to discover what the upshot 
of doing so is, namely, an account of Christian ethics that appears 
designed to avoid what Stout has identified as the two great contempo- 
rary dangers: irrelevance and lack of distinctiveness. And, indeed, this 
seems to be what Hauerwas intends. He says, for example, that the 
nineteenth-century theologians were right to argue that the truthful- 
ness of Christian convictions "resides in their practical force" but wrong 
to think that this meant justifying them by reinterpreting these beliefs 
in a way that made them universally acceptable and applicable. In fact, 
according to Hauerwas, attention to the narrative character of these 
convictions helps one to see that they do not need to be reformulated in 
order to be intelligible to the modern world. Thus, in Truthfulness and 
17 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1981), p. 89. 
18 Ibid. 
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Tragedy, he writes, "To emphasize the story character of the gospel... is 
a way to remind us of the inherently practical character of theological 
convictions. For Christian convictions are not meant to picture the 
world. They do not give a primitive metaphysics about how the world 
is constituted. Rather the gospel is a story that gives you a way of being 
in the world."19 This is why Hauerwas says that his work "implicitly 
involves a critique of a great deal of contemporary theology" and, in 
particular, that which, "seeks to uncover the meaning of Christian 
'symbols' or 'myth."'20 Such a theology attempts to make Christian 
beliefs intelligible apart from their practical application, and, yet, 
because the meaning of Christian convictions is inseparable from their 
practical implications, this is precisely what cannot be done. Any 
reductionistic theology is therefore averted. 
Moreover, this emphasis on the practical force of narrative also sug- 
gests why the refusal to reinterpret the doctrines of the Christian faith 
does not lead to a Kierkegaardian irrelevance. It does not because 
accepting narrative as a central category of Christian ethics is to 
express a "categorial preference for story over explanation as a vehicle 
of understanding."21 And, if we are not concerned about explanation, 
then we need not worry about "translating" the narratives of Scripture 
in a way that would allow them adequately to describe the modern 
world. On the contrary, what we will be concerned about is their 
ability to change the world, for this, says Hauerwas, is what the biblical 
stories were meant to do. Understanding the stories is thus inseparable 
from making them our own, and this means allowing these stories to 
shape the ways in which we both perceive the world and relate to it. 
Thus, for Hauerwas, the Christian stories do have a cognitive dimen- 
sion, for they provide categories for structuring our existence in the 
world. But these categories are not representational; they do not pic- 
ture the world and are not meant to explain it. Far from ending the 
dialogue with the modern, secular world, then, the Christian theologian 
is called to show that the stories of the Christian faith continue to offer a 
distinctive and truthful way of perceiving and relating to the world. 
CORRELATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Thus far, we have seen that the notion of narrative is central to the 
work of both Metz and Hauerwas and that in both cases there is a con- 
nection between this reliance on narrative and the existence of a certain 
19 Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 73. 
20 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 2. 
21 Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 34. 
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set of problems facing contemporary theology. But how is the work of 
each writer correlated to that of the other? This is a question we have 
not yet examined directly but which we must take up in this section of 
the paper. Since I have argued that their mutual reliance on narrative 
is not coincidental but the result of a response to similar concerns, there 
ought to be substantial overlap between the two. Noting this overlap 
should be a useful way of reinforcing my thesis. 
There are, I think, three particularly important areas of intersection 
between the work of Metz and that of Hauerwas, all related to a focus 
on narrative. The first is an emphasis on the social location of the indi- 
vidual. Both, as we have seen, resist the Enlightenment emphasis on 
the rational, autonomous individual who seeks abstraction from the 
particularities of historical existence. Both Metz's polemic against the 
"timeless decision" of the individual, which he says relegates religion to 
the status of an afterthought, and Hauerwas's emphasis on the impor- 
tance of community, as securing the holism absent in the standard 
account of moral rationality, are attempts to recover a view of the self 
that is socially, as opposed to individualistically, oriented. And in both 
cases, there is a clear connection here to the notion of narrative. We 
saw Metz saying, for example, that human consciousness is unavoid- 
ably entwined in stories and that man's identity is always shaped by 
narrative identification. But Hauerwas is equally clear: "Our argument 
put in traditional terms is that the moral life must be grounded in the 
'nature' of man. However, that 'nature' is not 'rationality' itself, but the 
necessity of having a narrative to give our life coherence."22 For both 
men, then, there is an important connection between the category of 
narrative and the view of human nature that informs their theological 
and ethical position. And whether it is the former that leads to the latter 
or the latter to the former, the important point is that narrative serves 
as a crucial category for both. 
The second point of overlap was also implicit in my earlier discus- 
sion, and it is this: for both writers there can be no strong distinction 
between theory and praxis. This is why for both Metz and Hauerwas 
theology cannot be distinguished from ethics as a separate discipline. 
Hence Hauerwas's comment that he is "uneasy" with the description of 
his work as "ethics" rather than "theology." Similarly, we find Metz 
describing his work as "practical fundamental theology" to emphasize 
that there can be no genuine theology that is not practical. Again, in 
both cases, the connection with narrative is present; for both see an 
emphasis on narrative as a move away from theory and to practice. As 
Hauerwas puts it, "The primary function of narratives by contrast to 
22 Ibid., p. 27. 
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explanatory schemes [is] to relate us to the world, including our plans 
for modifying it."23 With this, Metz would certainly agree. 
We come, then, to what is probably the most significant area of over- 
lap between Metz and Hauerwas; unhappily, it is also the most prob- 
lematic. It involves their respective accounts of the truthfulness of 
Christian convictions, and, in both cases, it is essentially a pragmatist 
one. We have seen, for example, that Hauerwas claims that the intel- 
ligibility and truthfulness of Christian convictions resides in their prac- 
tical force and that, according to Metz, the intelligibility of Christianity 
cannot be justified theoretically but only practically. It is Hauerwas, 
however, who most explicitly states the connection between this 
account of truth and the narrative structure of Christian belief. In A 
Community of Character, he writes: "The necessary interrelation of narra- 
tive and character provides the means to test the truthfulness of narra- 
tive. Significant narratives produce significant and various characters 
necessary for the understandings and richness of the story itself. Just as 
scientific theories are partially judged by the fruitfulness of the activ- 
ities they generate, so narratives can and should be judged by the rich- 
ness of moral character and activity they generate."24 That this is also 
Metz's view, there can be little doubt. Indeed, anticipating responses to 
his position, Metz himself raises one of the most telling objections to 
this account of truth. He writes: "What, in other words, is the position 
of truth in a practical fundamental theology? Is truth in this context not 
simply made subordinate to praxis? Is truth not re-interpreted as rele- 
vance? And does this re-interpretation not simply conceal... what 
really happens, namely the liquidation of the concept of truth, insofar 
as a truth that is oriented towards praxis is no longer truth?"25 Now I do 
not think that either Metz or Hauerwas satisfactorily answers this 
objection, and although I want to say more about this shortly, for now 
the interesting thing to note is that their answers turn out to be so 
similar. Indeed, the resemblance is so remarkable that it is worth 
setting their answers side by side. The first passage, then, is from 
Metz; the second from Hauerwas. 
It is only if truth is previously conceived as correlative with pure reason or 
theory or as the result of absolute reflection that this objection to practical 
fundamental theology and its supposed attitude toward truth can be 
sustained.26 
23 Ibid., p. 36. 
24 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 95. 
25 Metz, Faith in History and Society (n. 7 above), p. 59. 
26 Ibid., p. 60. 
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Under the spell of Kantian accounts of rationality, there lingers the fear that if 
we recognize the historic nature of our moral convictions we will have to 
acknowledge them as arbitrary and possibly even false. But such fear is ill 
founded, as there is no other basis of moral convictions than the historic and 
narrative-related experience of a community.27 
What we can now appreciate is that for both Hauerwas and Metz an 
appeal to the category of narrative is an effort to redress the cognitive 
crisis highlighted by Stout without abandoning claims to truthfulness. 
To the question, Which claims of Christian faith are true in the modern 
world? Hauerwas and Metz answer in unison that it is those that gen- 
erate a significant praxis. To the objection, But this pragmatic theory 
of truth is not a solution to the cognitive problems facing Christian 
thought but a rejection of them, Hauerwas and Metz again reply in 
unison that to believe thus is to accept a moribund epistemology. Once 
this mistaken epistemology is abandoned, they argue, pragmatism will 
appear unobjectionable. 
Yet, I think it can be argued that, even on their own terms, there are 
serious questions that can be raised about the adequacy of these respec- 
tive accounts of truth. For while both Metz and Hauerwas agree about 
the narrative structure of Christianity, and while both agree that the 
truthfulness of the Christian story is to be measured by its practical 
consequences, they disagree dramatically about what those conse- 
quences are. Since this is of some importance for assessisng the ade- 
quacy of the category of narrative in Christian ethics, I want to spend 
the final section of this paper examining how these two very similar 
accounts of the role of narrative in Christian thought result in two very 
different normative ethical positions. 
Once again the initial impression is one of resemblance. Both Metz 
and Hauerwas talk about the connection between narrative and a 
renewed emphasis on the Christian community, both highlight the 
practical implications of the memory of Jesus' death and resurrection, 
and both insist that Christian social action involves the imitation of 
Christ as revealed in the biblical narratives. Here, however, the resem- 
blance ends, for, if we look more closely at what each says the upshot of 
following these prescriptions will be, we may well feel that they are 
reading different stories. For Metz, the result is a life committed to near 
revolutionary social action; for Hauerwas, a life given to a sort of sec- 
tarian pacifistic witness. How then, do we account for this difference? 
The best way to answer this question, I think, is to take a look at how 
the category of narrative is related to the normative position with which 
it is associated. In Metz's case, this means examining the relation 
27 Hauerwas, A Community of Character (n. 17 above), pp. 98-99. 
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between what he argues are the three basic categories of a practical 
fundamental theology: memory, narrative, and solidarity. According 
to Metz, solidarity is the central category of Christian praxis and 
involves "the idea of the possibility of all men becoming subjects in the 
presence of God."28 But this notion, while central, is also vague and 
must be given a more determinate sense. And this is where memory 
and narrative come in. As Metz puts it at one point, "Memory and nar- 
rative only have a practical character when they are considered together 
with solidarity and solidarity has no specifically cognitive status with- 
out memory and narrative."29 The picture that emerges, then, is that of 
Christian praxis being shaped directly by the memory of the life and 
death of Jesus made available by the narratives of the Christian faith. 
And Metz is quite explicit about what that memory yields; it is, he 
says, "a specific memoria passionis" that is at the same time a memory of 
freedom. It is thus a "dangerous memory," and the stories through 
which it is mediated are "dangerous stories." They are dangerous 
because they introduce the "remembered freedom ofJesus into modern 
society" and demand that we make Jesus' allegiance with the oppressed 
and rejected our own. The stories, in other words, call for and make 
possible solidarity with the oppressed in the form of direct social action 
on their behalf. This is why, in A Theology of the World, Metz charac- 
terizes his position as one of "militant eschatology" and says that "the 
terminus a quo of the Christian mission should be the secular society."30 
For Metz, the biblical narratives relate the story of Jesus and the 
promises he made to the oppressed and downtrodden, promises that 
the story calls us to honor by working for their fulfillment. 
To get a sense of how wide the gap is here between Metz and Hauer- 
was, we need only look at several representative passages from Hauer- 
was. They show that, for Hauerwas, the terminus a quo of the Chris- 
tian mission is not secular society but the Christian community. 
For the service that Christians are called upon to provide does not have as its 
aim to make the world better, but to demonstrate that Jesus made possible a 
new world, a new social order.31 
Though this book touches on many issues it is dominated by one concern: to 
reassert the social significance of the church as a distinct society with an integ- 
rity peculiar to itself. My wish is that this book might help Christians redis- 
cover that their most important social task is nothing less than to be a com- 
munity capable of hearing the story of God we find in scripture.32 
28 Metz, Faith in History and Society, p. 229. 
29 Ibid., p. 183. 
30 Metz, A Theology of the World (n. 8 above), p. 96. 
31 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 92. 
32 Ibid., p. 1. 
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The problem, it seems, is that there is more than one story to be told, 
and Metz and Hauerwas would indeed seem to be telling and listening 
to different tales. We can see this by simply contrasting the central 
themes of their respective stories. As we have seen, for Metz the pre- 
dominant theme is that of the promise of freedom and liberation from 
the burdens of economic and social inequality; for Hauerwas, however, 
the central motif is the notion of life as gift. According to Hauerwas, 
this is what the biblical narratives provide, namely, an understanding 
of the world as ruled by powers other than violence and death. 
"Because," says Hauerwas, Christians "have the confidence that Jesus' 
cross and resurrection are the final words concerning God's rule," they 
are freed to trust, rather than fear, others, including their oppressors. 
It is here, then, that Hauerwas most clearly diverges from Metz. For 
while Hauerwas says that "interpretation does not preclude action," he 
also says that the first and most important responsibility of the church 
is to provide "categories of interpretation that offer the means for us to 
understand ourselves truthfully, e.g., we are a sinful yet redeemed 
people."33 This is why Hauerwas says that the Christian stories do not 
offer us a resolution of life difficulties or a strategy for such a resolu- 
tion. Rather, they offer us a way of understanding ourselves and the 
world in terms of which such difficulties are insignificant. 
That this could not be further from Metz's view should by now be 
clear. Yet what are we to make of this? At the very least, I think it 
ought to highlight the concerns I raised about the account of truth that 
both Metz and Hauerwas associate with the category of narrative. For 
whatever similarities the two exhibit in discussing the importance of 
narrative as an epistemological category of Christian thought, when it 
comes to recommendations for practical action, the category of narra- 
tive by itself appears to play almost no role at all. Indeed, it neither 
helps to explain nor to justify the normative position of either Metz or 
Hauerwas. It fails to explain their positions because there is no sub- 
stantive moral position entailed merely by appeal to the category of 
narrative. Yet there appears to be no way to argue for this substantive 
content since, on the terms set out by Metz and Hauerwas, the only 
argument available is one based on the practical consequences them- 
selves, and these will, of course, depend on the substantive content that 
we are trying to justify. The fact that Metz and Hauerwas diverge so 
sharply when applying the category of narrative normatively signals a 
serious problem. For if the truthfulness of the Christian story is to be 
judged by its practical consequences, and these consequences are as 
varied as Hauerwas and Metz's writings would suggest, how does an 
33 Ibid., p. 109. 
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appeal to narrative establish the truthfulness of Christian convictions, 
even on pragmatic grounds? 
Both authors appear to assume that, because members of the Chris- 
tian community share a common story, they will share a common 
praxis. But this fails to account for the variety of moral patterns derived 
from this story. Indeed, we have seen that the praxis embraced by 
Hauerwas is very different from the praxis embraced by Metz. Nor is 
this a problem merely for Metz and Hauerwas. It is a problem for 
anyone who wants to appeal to the place of narrative in the moral life. 
In fact, this divergence between Metz and Hauerwas highlights a 
fundamental problem for anyone assigning narrative a central place in 
theology and ethics: when we have endorsed a preference for story over 
explanation and argument, what do we do when our stories conflict? 
Or again: if two interpretations of the same story diverge, how do we 
resolve this conflict? The best that Metz and Hauerwas seem to offer in 
response is that we should test our stories or our interpretations by their 
practical consequences. But for the reasons given above, this test 
appears impossible to apply. There is no substantive moral view entailed 
merely by appeal to the general category of narrative, and any appeal 
to an actual narrative will require interpretation. Thus, the fact that 
Metz and Hauerwas diverge so sharply in their respective interpreta- 
tions of the Christian narrative should leave one less than sanguine 
here. 
Still, there are limits to the possible interpretations of a story, even a 
narrative as rich as the Christian story. For this reason, Hauerwas and 
Metz can perhaps claim that an ethic based on the Christian story is 
distinctive. I suppose, too, that there is merit to their suggestion that, if 
one does not treat Christianity as a primitive metaphysics but as a 
story with life-transforming potential, Christianity will remain relevant 
in the modern world. But avoiding Stout's dilemma, irrelevance or 
indistinctiveness, is not the same as securing truth. We must remember 
that this dilemma itself is generated by the apparent improbability of 
Christian convictions in the modern world. The root problem, then, is 
one of truth. And failing to give an adequate account of the truthful- 
ness of the Christian narratives is every bit as fatal as making Chris- 
tianity either irrelevant or indistinctive. 
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